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The other side of Shanghai's success story 'Corrupt, pleasure-mad, squalor-ridden'. This description of Shanghai was written in the 1930s. But as Jasper Becker reports, China's economic boom has resurrected old problems in its second city
11 August 2004 The
oak-panelled walls and Ionic marble columns of the Astor Hotel's
reception hall lend it a grandeur that war and revolution have not
altered since Bertrand Russell and Bernard Shaw succumbed to Shanghai's
splendid decadence. Inside, the plumbing in the rooms (each marked by a
brass plaque and a faded photograph) has deteriorated, but outside the
beggars would have been familiar. "Just something to eat," pleaded an
old peasant woman thrusting forward a four-year-old, far too young to
be her own son, holding a broken plastic disposable cup. "We are Anhui
peasants who lost our land in last year's floods; please give a
little.'' The child beggars are back on Shanghai's
streets, pestering the shoppers browsing the fashion boutiques in
Nanjing Road and Huaihai Road or embarrassing revellers as they leave
the nightclubs heading for their chauffeur-driven BMWs and Porsches.
While an embryonic capitalism booms, its grim underbelly is being
exposed. Prostitution, the symbol of all that was
wrong with old China, is so widespread, with an estimated three million
prostitutes in the country, that the experts are debating whether to
legalise it. Fifteen years ago in the former "city without night" there
was not a single private bar: Shanghai now boasts the whole gamut from
exclusive businessmen's clubs, yuppy bars and private "KTV rooms" where
you hire the girls by the hour, to the massage parlours on every street
corner that offer a briefer moment of pleasure. By
the 1930s, Shanghai's beggars were almost as infamous as its courtesans
and spawned an alluring mythology. Its 50,000 beggars were said to have
been organised in eight leagues ruled by a beggar king who traced his
ancestry back to the Ming dynasty. The leaders allocated begging
patches, prevented turf wars and operated a parallel hierarchy to
respectable society. The beggars even supported the patriotic May 1919
protest movement and negotiated with the city's bosses: the gangsters
and foreign capitalists. The foreigners who ran the British, French and
American concessions never found a solution. Shanghai's
professional beggars traditionally came from five places, including
Fengyang in Anhui province where Deng Xiaoping's agricultural reforms
started after Mao Tse-tung's death and which has a tradition of
organising seasonal beggary. It was the home of Zhu Yuanzhang, the
beggar who founded the Ming dynasty. Most beggars,
especially those with young children, claim to come from one of these
places, but they also tend to change their story under questioning like
the elderly man at the entrance to the Astor who first blamed his
misfortunes on natural disaster and then on a physical handicap.
"Actually, it's my leg," he said suddenly demonstrating a limp and
walking off to avoid further questions. Residents
seem divided on whether to expel the beggars or to treat them as
innocent victims of misfortune. "Of course, you shouldn't beat them.
How can you be inhumane to poor peasants?" said Zhang Weidi, a taxi
driver. The police have now proposed setting up a task force to deal
with the problem and the media has been reporting on the "tricks" used
by the beggars. China News Service said Shanghai
had its own Fagin, Bao Wulian, 36, who recruited a gang of children
aged six to 12 whom he trained to beg, cheat and steal. He taught them
how to pick pockets and snaffle mobile phones and wallets until he was
arrested. Shanghai and other cities in China have
begun debating new ordinances to deal with beggars. Until last year the
police could detain and arrest anyone with a peasant resident card and
punish them with a stint in a work camp if they had no written
exemption. Last year the "arrest and repatriation" regulations were
changed for the first time in nearly 50 years after a case in Guangzhou
where a man, Sun Zhigang, was detained for not carrying a valid
residency card. He died in police custody, causing a public scandal. Under
the new regulations, police cannot use force to expel beggars but are
supposed to persuade them to accept 10 days of food and shelter at
government expense. "The problem is that most beggars are not willing
to leave the streets because they think they can make more money by
begging," Pan Zihan, a senior police officer, told municipal
legislators last year. In Guangzhou, the
authorities prohibit begging in government buildings, subways,
hospitals, stores, parks and other places of public entertainment. A
poll taken by the Southern Daily found that 52 per cent of
residents said that the ban would not solve the overall problem of
rural poverty although 30 per cent agreed that the beggars damaged the
city's image. In Shanghai some people have opposed a ban. "The country is a country of citizens, and all citizens enjoy equal rights," the Yangcheng Evening News said. "Begging bans are a form of administrative coercion." A
similar form of leniency is now taken towards prostitution. In
Shanghai, it is becoming more open. It flourishes along such streets as
Maoming Nan Lu, where in a string of bars such as Manhattan or Judy's,
women accost foreign businessmen. "Oh, are there girls like that coming
here?" said Judy. A women in her late 30s, she set up the bar 10 years
ago but now has other businesses. "We must stop that," she said, then
added, after a minute's thought: "Perhaps we could allow only a few of
them in. Just the very beautiful ones. I like to have beautiful people
around me." The business has made her rich and she
now has a portfolio of investments in nightclubs, bars and residential
properties. Judy goes on holiday to Italy a few times a year and drives
a BMW convertible. Some working girls say they have also done well,
buying themselves flats and imported cars. As in
the 1930s when the city was full of White Russian refugees, some of the
girls are Russians or Mongolians, adding a touch of exoticism to the
jaded palates of the Shanghai nightclubbers. As the competition between
the bars heats up, some feature scantily dressed girls gyrating on the
tables, or project images of half-naked pole dancers on the walls. A
few doors down the street is the Babyface Disco. Earlier this year,
police had to break up a brawl between Chinese and Western clients, yet
police who patrol the street in force seem more concerned about the
noise levels than public morality. Last week, all
of the bars were ordered to stop playing music because it was annoying
a new and powerful resident. Judy's bar acquired a noise meter to
ensure that it did not antagonise the authorities. Perhaps
Shanghai will soon regain the reputation it enjoyed in the 1930s, when
it was presented as the new Babylon and a "corrupt, pleasure-mad, and
squalor-ridden city". As one writer, Stella Dong, put it, "the sickly
sweet smell of opium permeated every lane and side street, and in its
myriad fleshpots laboured a tragic army of prostitutes and 'taxi
dancers'." Greater Shanghai reportedly had 100,000
prostitutes and when the Red Army marched into Shanghai in 1949, it
arrested the prostitutes and other social parasites. They were sent to
camps to be reformed and re-educated in socialist morality and emerge
with new and more useful skills. Shanghai's
reputation has inspired a small but growing volume of academic research
devoted to studying the phenomenon of its prostitutes. In Dangerous Pleasures: Prostitution and Modernity in Twentieth Century Shanghai,
the American academic Gail Hershatter points out that at a time when
China's power was sapped by foreign aggression, "sex work was taken as
paradigmatic of a social decay that was then evoked to explain China's
position vis-a-vis the colonising powers". Some of
the reformed girls were put on stage to act out their escape from
degradation to scenes of mass hysteria from the audience of students.
Prostitution, nationalism, and memories of former humiliation at the
hands of the outside world still provoke the same moral outrage. Last
year, when 400 Japanese sex tourists arrived in Zhuhai, Guangdong for
an orgy with 500 Chinese girls, there was a diplomatic protest. The
hotel management protested that "prostitution is a common phenomenon in
hotels across the country" but the incident was timed as an insult to
the Chinese nation. It took place two days before the 72nd anniversary
of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. Hershatter
argues that in old Shanghai the better class of courtesans were in fact
not so much victims of capitalism as empowered. They amassed some
semblance of power "by manipulating standards of masculinity, and by
shaping discourses in society, law, and China's own deteriorating
political situation". Chinese sociologists are treating the problem as
an inevitable part of economic reform. The left-wing economist Yang
Fan, who assumes a figure of 20 million prostitutes nationwide - the
police assume three million - has calculated that the income and
spending associated with prostitution amounts to about 6 per cent of
gross domestic product. He claims that after Beijing issued new
regulations on the management of places of entertainment in 1999, GDP
dropped by 1 per cent because bars and dance halls closed. One
of the leading experts is Pan Suiming, a sociologist from the
University of China in Beijing, who has spent seven years studying the
issue. He and seven researchers interviewed 700 prostitutes and pimps
in 13 red-light districts in the Pearl River Delta, Sichuan province
and two north-eastern provinces. The research
looked at the economic pros and cons for investment- hungry towns if
they encouraged or at least tolerated prostitution. Some cities such as
Shenyang have tried to regulate the industry by taxing prostitutes'
earnings. In Wuhan, working girls have been issued with work permits.
Towns in the Pearl River Delta encourage prostitution as a way of
attracting investors to set up factories. The
debate about how to deal with prostitution, and with begging, is not
unlike that recorded in the minutes of the Shanghai municipal council.
In 1920, it resolved to end the system of licensed brothels in the
International Settlement with a plan to restrict the numbers until
there was none left. Professor Pan thinks that
China should legalise the industry, or at least ignore it. "The biggest
problem in the sex industry is the banning policy. I hope this policy
will be changed," he said recently. He argues that when prostitution is
illegal, women fall under the control of criminal gangs. "If these
people treat the girls violently, they cannot go to the police because
they are afraid of getting arrested or fined," he said. He also argues
that if the girls worked independently, the use of condoms would rise
and the rates of sexually transmitted diseases would drop. Shanghai
is beginning to worry about a sharp rise in HIV cases which is being
blamed on the unwillingness or ignorance of the influx of young sex
workers. An Aids expert at Shanghai's Hua Shan Hospital has found that
in 2002 the rate of HIV infections, although still low, increased by 45
per cent. Shanghai health officials say that, of
those infected, 67 per cent of married and 45 per cent of single males
caught the disease from prostitutes and infected their partners. A
survey found that most clients were middle-class office workers under
35 - the very people fêted for driving the other end of the city's
booming economy. RETURN TO MENU |
How Mongolia learnt to love its leopards
No one knows how many snow leopards inhabit the remote mountains of
Asia. But the struggle to protect them may have changed the Mongol view
of this elusive predator. Jasper Becker reports from Ulan Bator 29 July 2004 Only
paw prints in the snow and the two small puncture marks in the neck of
a sheep drained of blood reveal that the elusive snow leopard had come
and gone. "This leopard killed a dozen animals, including my prize
breeding buck," Surengerel, a wind-burnt herdswoman, tells the visitors
enjoying mugs of tea at the stove of her round felt tent, pitched in a
remote corner of the Gobi Desert. We are at
Bayantooroi, a tiny settlement 600 miles south-west of the capital Ulan
Bator, on the edge of the Great Gobi Protected Area, home to 50 snow
leopards, rare breeds of wild camels, goats, sheep and Ursus arctos gobiensis , the world's only desert bear. It
was an unusual winter, when the vast desert was covered with a foot of
snow and Surengerel's family struggled to save the flock of 200 goats
and sheep, plus 20 camels, on which they depend to scrape a living in
one of the world's harshest climates. Some neighbours lost all their
animals; nobody could recall anything like it. For a month, delivering
fodder to the livestock was impossible, she said, because even
four-wheel drives stuck in the snowdrifts. The snow leopard went hungry
too. Unable to hunt their usual prey - wild argali sheep, antelope and
ibex - the big cats came out of the mountains to attack the herds. Surengerel's
visitor says soothingly: "It is good that nobody went out and killed
the snow leopard." Doljinsuren, a Mongolian who works for the
Seattle-based International Snow Leopard Trust (many Mongolians have
only one name) has travelled here armed with bundles of cash. First,
she pays the herders a bonus of 500,000 Tughrik (£230) for honouring
their contract to protect the snow leopard. Then she sorts through a
pile of camel-hair slippers, scarves, socks and little wool effigies of
the silky predator, which she is going to buy and ship to America. The
herdswomen had knitted the handicrafts during the winter, and soon the
goods will be sold in international zoos in a worldwide conservation
effort to save the shyest and most beautiful of all the great cats. The
first photograph of a wild snow leopard was taken only in the 1970s in
Chitral, Pakistan, because they are harder to track than tigers and
live in the wildest parts of the earth. The silver-grey fur is such
good camouflage in the hunting dusk that even when radio-collared, with
signals showing the big cat is present, the predator can be hard to
spot. The animal was first studied by the American
naturalist, George Schaller, but it was elevated into a poetic symbol
when he went on an expedition to Nepal with Peter Matthiessen, author
of the bestselling The Snow Leopard in the late 1970s. Although
snow leopards range across the high and remote mountains of Asia, that
isolation no longer protects the species. Some of these mountains are
in civil war zones, such as the Tora Bora mountains in Afghanistan, the
Hindu Kush, Jammu and Kashmir and the Pamirs of Tajikistan. With
the spread of the market economy to inner Asia, the predator fell
victim to hunters in more peaceful zones, including Kyrgyzstan,
Mongolia and Xinjiang in China. Shops in areas of China - as in Tibet,
Qinghai and Gansu - openly sold snow leopard pelts and their "tiger"
bones, used to make Chinese medicine. Some snow
leopards are also caught for private zoos in Middle Eastern countries
where the animal is traditionally prized as a symbol of power and
nobility. In ancient times, loyal subjects had gifted Mongol Khans, a ger
or tent made from snow leopard pelts instead of felt. In Kyrgyzstan,
poachers may have killed a third of the snow leopard population since
1994. The pelts can fetch as much as $70 (£38) a skin, as much as some
herders earn in a year. Customs officers in Mongolia seized so many
illegal snow-leopard skins they put them on public display at the
Genghis Khan tourist camp near the capital. Worldwide,
there may be just 3,500 snow leopards left, although the figure could
be much higher, depending on the result of research starting in China.
The country, especially Xinjiang, has the world's largest snow leopard
terrain and may hold up to 2,500 of the animals. Until recently, there
were few study tools available, other than looking at the potential
habitat and dividing it by the average hunting territory each cat would
require. When a biologist, Tom McCarthy, spent
seven years doing field research in this part of Mongolia, he concluded
that a snow leopard ranges over 150 square miles, depending on the
availability of ibex, antelope, wild Argali sheep and marmots. Scientists
are looking at hi-tech methods such as genetic fingerprinting and
photo-traps for a more reliable population estimate, vital in forming
conservation strategies. Two years ago, environmentalists from 17
countries met at Woodland Park Zoo in Seattle to form the first global
plan to save the snow leopard. A key issue was developing ways to
persuade those who live with the predator to help the conservation
effort. Here in the Gobi-Altai, the nomads have
little affection for the snow leopard, and see it is a living vampire,
a notion Tom McCarthy says is not founded on fact. The trust is also
trying to change the image of the snow leopard by using snow leopard
clubs to teach children the necessity of conservation. Doljinsuren
well remembers four years ago, when his group began teaching the nomads
how to wash and thread their wool. "Getting people to trust us was a
big step," he says. "The first year, the products were not saleable,
but we bought them anyway." The International Snow
Leopard Trust is promoting other efforts, hoping the nomads will help
protect the habitat, the prey and the animals themselves. In Pakistan,
herders have been persuaded to pay into insurance funds to compensate
herders who lose livestock to wolves and snow leopards. Another project
aims to help herders with veterinary advice to help reduce the high
number of livestock lost to disease - about 20 per cent - so they care
less about the much smaller numbers killed by predators. In
Kyrgyzstan, wildlife rangers who earn $15 a month are being offered
incentives such as school fees for their children if they protect the
animals and their prey from poachers. Saving the
snow leopard also needs cross-border solutions and experts from India
and Pakistan are discussing how to work together in the disputed
Kashmir region. Indian environmentalists plan to copy the schemes that
worked in Pakistan and the Pakistanis are interested in the handicraft
schemes started in Mongolia four years ago. Purevjur,
a Mongolian biologist, who has spent 17 years tracking the 1,200 or so
snow leopards in Mongolia, thinks the population has stabilised in the
past few years. "Maybe it is even beginning to increase slowly," she
says. But the nomads killed about six snow leopards
in the Gobi Altai last year and as many in other parts of the country.
Those caught face fines of 1m Tughriks, a large enough fine to wipe out
their capital, measured in livestock. The biggest
problem facing the conservationists and the herders has been the
unusually severe weather, and over-grazing. Dr Mizhiddorj is a director
of the Gobi reserve and a biologist who studied the snow leopard with
Tom McCarthy. "There's been hardly any rain the past seven years, just
a little in May, and the average temperatures keep rising," he says.
"It is hard to pinpoint the reason but perhaps it is to do with global
warming." On the way to Bayantooroi, we stopped by
the ruins of the Nomuun Khaan Buddhist monastery which stands by what
was once a river and a lake that helped support a thriving population
of monks and farmers. Gelegbuu, our 45- year-old driver, says: "When I
was small, children and lambs could hide in the grass it was so high;
flocks of cranes and pelicans covered the lake." The
drought in a long-dry region is having a severe impact on animals and
people. Half of the province's two million head of livestock have died
in the past few years of drought, leaving the plains littered with
whitening bones. Gelegbuu says: "If the drought goes on, everyone will
leave." Lester Brown, a environmentalist for the
Worldwatch Institute in Washington, suspects that over-grazing, led by
demand for cashmere wool, is largely to blame for the drought, hurting
farmers and herders in many parts of snow leopard territory. Herders
doubled the size of their cashmere goat herds in the 1990s. "There is
more pressure on resources so the deserts are expanding," Mr Brown
says. For Surengerel, the $60 she has earnt for
family from handicrafts has become a vital asset. The snow leopards are
now beginning to protect the people. Doljinsuren says: "Of course,
people are glad to see me. Everyone wants to learn now." RETURN TO MENU |
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Shanghai, the city that saved Jews fleeing Nazis
China's premier trading city is burying most of its past beneath
fast-rising mountains of steel and glass. But Hongkou, once the home of
families escaping the Holocaust, may yet be saved. Jasper Becker reports 28 June 2004 Wangfa
Liang remembers clearly the whipped cream, the roof top orchestras, the
prayers in the synagogue when this slummy stretch of Shanghai dockland
was called "Little Vienna". "There were tables
outside on the street, and I remember the wedding parties in Café
Vienna. My boss was a Russian Jew, Mr Stein, and the other waiters came
from Berlin. We were all friends and lived in the ghetto," he said in
careful English. Now 85, Mr Liang has finally been
forced to move out of the house he bought from his Jewish colleagues
when they left before the Communist takeover in 1949. Along
the northern bank of the Huangpu river, just beyond the Bund and across
an iron girder bridge, is the district of Hongkou, an area of docklands
which became famous when it was home to nearly 30,000 Jews during the
Japanese occupation of Shanghai. It looks much as it did when Steven
Spielberg's Empire of the Sun , based on J G Ballard's
autobiographical book, was filmed in 1987. The area is now back in the
news because of a daring plan to preserve it from the wrecker's ball
and transform it into a conservation zone and a symbol of Chinese and
Jewish friendship. It is also a last-gasp effort to save what remains
of Shanghai's architectural heritage and prevent it being turned into a
cold megalopolis of glass-and-steel towers. Already,
the area, better known in the past as Hongkew, is full of cranes and
building sites. Over the former Vienna café looms a 40-story concrete
hotel and Mr Liang and his neighbours are quickly being moved out of
the last of the pink-and-grey brick houses, where the refugees had
lived, to new residential blocks. Mr Liang is now the guide at the Ohel
Moshe synagogue which was once at the centre of the ghetto and is now a
museum. Visitors, including Hillary Clinton,
Madeline Albright, Gerhard Shröder and all Israeli leaders, are shown a
video inside the offices of what was once the headquarters of the
Zionist Youth League. The area was destined to be
demolished under a government plan to turn the whole of the North Bund
into "a masterpiece of the 21st century", that is to say, another
ultra-ambitious scheme to remake Shanghai from scratch. The city
invited big developers to put forward ideas which included the
inevitable skyscrapers as well as a Ferris Wheel, fun fairs and a dock
for luxury cruise passengers to disembark. Worried
that nothing there would be left for the visitors to see, Shanghai is
now studying several plans to try to preserve the ghetto. One plan has
been put forward by Canadian-Jewish businessman Lan Leventhal, and
designed by Christopher Choa of one of New York's oldest architectural
firms, HLW International. They want to make the
synagogue the centre of a memorial park that would include gravestones
of former inhabitants and link it to the waterfront and an ornate
Buddhist temple. Already, a small monument in a park near the synagogue
is dedicated to the "stateless refugees" of 1937-1941. The
Jewish gravestones were moved in 1958, and destroyed and scattered
during the Cultural Revolution. A few have been discovered in outlying
villages where they were being used as flagstones and washboards. The
idea seems to be to copy the success of Xin Tiandi, a two-square block
of tenements in the old French concession which was saved and turned
into a lively centre for shopping and dining. This is the work of
Benjamin Wood, an American architect who persuaded a Hong Kong property
developer, Vincent Lo, the chairman of the Shui On Group, to preserve
the area around the girl's school where the Chinese Communist Party
held its first meeting. "Xin Tiandi is successful,
but you can't call that preservation," says Professor Ruan Yisan of
Tongji University. The old buildings were torn down, the residents
evicted, and new buildings erected housing ultra-stylish bars and
nightclubs. Yet as one of the parts of Shanghai built on a human scale,
it has become immensely popular with visitors and residents. Ilan
Maor, the Israeli consul general in Shanghai, is convinced the new plan
for the ghetto area in Hangkou will be as successful. "I am sure it
will be an important tourist attraction," he said. Professor Ruan said: "It is also important to preserve it to show the strong bonds between the two peoples." The
first wave of refugees arrived in the 1920s, fleeing the Russian
revolution. They settled in Harbin which was home to 20,000 refugees
until the mid-1930s. There, the Chinese authorities have just restored
two synagogues, a cemetery and a Jewish school and are planning the
Harbin Museum for Jewish History and Culture. "There
was no other shelter open to the Jews. It was a unique situation. The
Chinese not only let them in, they made them welcome," Mr Maor said. The
next group came in the 1930s, fleeing from the Soviet invasion of
Lithuania, Latvia and Poland. Israel is still grateful to the Japanese
consul in Lithuania, Chiune Sugihara, who disobeyed Tokyo's
instructions and issued over 2,000 visas to Jews who until 1941 used
them to take the Trans-Siberian Railway to Vladivostok. From there they
took a boat to Kobe, Japan, and then another to Shanghai. Other
refugees fled Germany, Austria and other countries as they came under
the Nazi heel. The Chinese consul general in Vienna, Dr Feng Shan Ho,
also ignored the Kuomintang's orders and issued over 20,000 visas
between 1938 and 1940. The KMT had strong ties to
Germany in the 1920s but turned against Hitler when he formed a pact
with Japan. Among Chiang Kai-shek's followers was Morris "two-gun"
Cohen, a bodyguard who rose to be a general in the Chinese Army. The
Jewish refugees joined the White Russian refugees and crowded into a
city caught up in bitter fighting between the Japanese and KMT forces
under Chiang. By the time the Japanese seized Shanghai, 25,000 people
were crammed into less than one square mile. In
fact they survived more thanks to the Japanese than the Chinese. After
the start of Japan's war with the US, they were forced into a ghetto,
about a square mile in size, where some 100,000 Chinese already lived.
It was a crowded, working-class area near the docks, but they were free
to open their own restaurants and shops, though they needed special
permits to leave the area. The British and others were interned in
camps outside Shanghai. In July 1942, the Gestapo
chief in Japan, Colonel Josef Meisinger, came to Shanghai and put
forward his plan for a "Final Solution in Shanghai". The Japanese
authorities refused to listen. Many powerful figures in Japan felt a
debt of gratitude to Jewish bankers who had organised loans and issued
government bonds which enabled the Japanese government and the military
to finance its modernisation program 30 years earlier. After Japan's
defeat, many of the refugees eventually reached America, Australia,
Israel and other countries. The great Jewish families of Shanghai, the
Kadoories, Hardoons and Sassoons never got their properties back,
although some branches still prosper in Hong Kong. The Kadoories still
own China Light and Power, Hong Kong's largest power utility. These
Jewish families were among the first group of immigrants, some 700
Sephardic Jews, to arrive from Baghdad, Spain, Portugal and India when
the British and French began to turn Shanghai into China's premier
trading city 150 years ago. Until the early 1920s, just 1,700 Jews were
in Shanghai but they were prominent and the Chinese Communist Party has
been reluctant to preserve or celebrate their capitalist legacy. The
Sassoons, who arrived in 1844, built the luxurious Cathay Hotel (now
the Peace Hotel). Sir Victor Sassoon lived in a fantastic nouveau Tudor
villa with a minstrel's gallery and a fireplace big enough to roast an
ox in. It is now the Hotel Cypress. The Kadoories
left behind a white, wedding cake-style mansion which is now the
Children's Palace. The famous Shanghai Musical Conservatory is housed
in the former Shanghai Jewish Club. "These people were big capitalists,
speculators, opium-dealers. They came here to make money, like the
English went to America," said Professor Ruan. The
Ohel Rachel Synagogue, the majestic building built in 1920 by Sir Jacob
Elias Sassoon in memory of his wife, Rachel, is now on the World
Monuments Fund list of the 100 most endangered sites. It remains closed
to the public and for years was used as offices by the city's education
commission The question of what to do with the heritage of all the
capitalists and colonialists which remind people of the good-old,
bad-old days when Shanghai was the Paris of the East remains a
headache. They left the city full of architectural
gems: the neo-classical facades of the Bund, the elegant Art Deco
hotels, the Gotham-Gothic mansions, complete with mullioned windows and
stained glass, of the rich Chinese and Western tycoons, and the
Edwardian suburban villas of the middle classes. Only
three areas have been earmarked for preservation and just 400 old
buildings. According to the Shanghai government, more than 20 million
square meters of old buildings, half of Shanghai's old neighbourhoods
have been torn down in the past 15 years. The
Chinese Communists want to trump this legacy and present the world with
a a dazzling modern city by the time it hosts the World Expo in 2010. It
can be a harsh process. Developers have free rein to evict people and
often do so overnight. The inhabitants of a stretch of land in the
French concession, not far from Xin Tiandi, were pushed out last month
by 300 police and thugs hired by a relocation company when they refused
to move quickly enough. There were reports of beatings and some houses
were set on fire. "Shanghai property prices are
rising so fast that people can't afford to buy new apartments so they
refuse to leave without better compensation," said Mr Liang. The
decrepit houses around the ghetto are a sad, dishevelled sight with the
washing hanging from the windows. The rooms have been divided again and
again and most people are, he says, happy to move out. They
will have to rebuild from scratch before the project can become the
symbol of the new ties growing between Israel and China that its
supporters want to see. Shanghai's new Jewish
Community is growing fast and now numbers around 500, including 150
Israelis. An Orthodox rabbi, Shalom Greenberg, moved here five years
ago although the Chinese government refuses to let the community open,
or re-open a synagogue because Judaism is not considered one of the
five official religions. Even so, commercial ties
are flourishing and Israel sent a delegation of over 100 business
leaders last week. The Chinese are particularly interested in building
up ties with Israeli hi-tech companies. One of
those who escaped from Germany and found shelter in Shanghai was Saul
Eisenberg. Later, in Israel, he built up a commercial empire in the
defence sector, the Eisenberg Group. He died recently but had tried to
broker the sale of arms to China, including an Awacs early warning
surveillance aircraft, which was blocked by the US. Israel still needs
to find a way to counterbalance China's ties with Arab countries as it
becomes more reliant on imported oil to run its economy. If
the ghetto is preserved, it will be another sign that the tide is
turning against skyscrapers in Shanghai, which has built over 3,000 in
just over a decade. Work resumed last year on the 101-storey Shanghai
World Financial Centre which aims to be the world's tallest building
when it is completed in 2007. Shanghai has become a city of towers, a city designed to impress outsiders with its modernity but not one to live in. The
sheer weight of all these towers is causing the city to sink into the
swampy banks of the Huangpu river. Experts say it sank about 8 feet
since 1921 and is still sinking at roughly half an inch a year. Even
the city's prized, German-built, magnetic railway is sinking. "There
are too many tall buildings. Profit-chasing by developers has destroyed
the urban space. The competition for higher and higher buildings has
created a dinosaur city, with more and more gigantic buildings. It is
not on a human scale, it is not good for the life of ordinary people,"
admitted Zheng Shiling, a prominent architect who heads the Shanghai
Urban Planning Commission's Urban Space and Environment Committee. "Many
of them are empty and can't be sold. Perhaps 30 per cent. If you go
around at night you will see there are no lights, said Professor Ruan. Another 40 or 50 high rises have been approved and can't be stopped but he thinks they will be the last. RETURN TO MENU |
Tiananmen Square, 15 years on
Despite
its booming economy, China is no closer to establishing democracy than
when the People's Liberation Army massacred protesting students in
Beijing in 1989. Jasper Becker reports 04 June 2004 Most
days, the Avenue of Eternal Peace is jammed solid all the way to
Tiananmen Square, but now and again it comes back to me: the rumbling
tanks, the bodies on the overpass, the window-panes riddled with
bullet-holes, the pall of smoke over the city. There,
in front of that hotel lobby, an enraged mob beat to death groups of
soldiers, and here, a few days earlier, the ecstatic crowds waving
banners saying, "Give me democracy or death" and laughing and holding
up V signs, confident they had won. Occasionally,
as I sit in my car watching my neighbours as we inch along the 12-lane
highway that passes the new ministries and department stores housed in
towers of steel and glass, I wonder what might have happened if 15
years ago, the student protesters had not lost. China
would now be democratic and the Communist Party would be gone. Instead
of Chairman Mao's squat mausoleum on Tiananmen Square, there would be a
white statue of the Goddess of Democracy. The Dalai Lama would be back
in Tibet, former Premier Li Peng, who declared martial law, would be in
jail or exile in Cuba. Instead of wasting their time on a campus in
distant America, some of the brilliant student leaders, including Wang
Dan, would have formed a Democracy Party and won the first elections. Perhaps,
as in Russia, the young generation would have been ousted after
fumbling a sweeping privatisation programme, and former Communists in a
Socialist Party of China would be back in power. As
it is, the head of the reformist wing of the party, the former general
secretary, Zhao Ziyang, who had gone to Tiananmen Square to tearfully
apologise, saying he had come too late, is still under house arrest. At
84, he is close to death, a prisoner in an old courtyard house, his
name excised from all official histories. The world
too would have been a very different place. China would not just be the
largest democracy in history but for the first time most of the world's
population would be living in democracies. This would have left the
Arab world and parts of Africa as the last holdouts. China
would probably have emerged, after messy politicking, into a sort of
federal super state, a cross between the United States and a Chinese
version of the European Union. Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, Xinjiang might
have fitted in easily into this scheme. The rest of the world would
have looked different too. North Korea might have disappeared. Vietnam
and Laos might be democracies too and Cambodia would surely not be
ruled by former members of the Khmer Rouge. Instead, every 4 June, the
anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre (known in China as Liu Si or
6/4), we go through the same almost ritualised programme. Clusters
of armed police and plain-clothes police ring the square where the
hunger-strikers pitched their tent city, to make sure not a single
wreath or gesture of grief finds a public display. China's vast secret
police force is mobilised to ensure not a single word appears in
public. CCN broadcasts are cut short. Every internet website and chat
room is monitored or blocked. The handful of remaining dissidents are
hustled out of town and kept under guard. The
mothers of those killed on the night of 4 June, led by the redoubtable
Ding Zilin, smuggle out protests and condemnations. Bao Tong, the
former aide of Zhao Ziyang and the most senior party official to be
jailed, has again called on the party to reconsider its "verdict" that
the protests were a "counter-revolutionary rebellion". The only legal
protests in China are in Hong Kong where tens of thousands are expected
to stage a a march and the annual candlelit vigil tonight. The
democracy drive galvanised the supposedly apolitical Hong Kong Chinese,
and a million people took to the streets. This
week, Yeung Sum, chairman of the Democratic Party, said mainland
officials made him an offer: drop the annual demands for apology for
the 4 June crackdown and we can negotiate about more democracy for Hong
Kong. He refused, against a backdrop of mainland efforts to harass and
intimidate public figures, such as the popular radio host Albert
Cheung. Three radio hosts known for their pro-democracy views, have
fled the territory after threatening phone calls from Chinese
officials. Although 4 June and democracy remains
the key issue in Hong Kong, in Beijing one could be forgiven for
thinking it never happened. The government demanded a collective
amnesia and seem to have achieved it. On the eve of the anniversary, I
spent an evening with a senior Chinese journalist talking about press
freedom; the issue never came up. Amnesty
International believes more than 50 people are still imprisoned for
their part in the protests, but this is only a fraction of the true
figure. At least 30 demonstrators who disappeared that night have never
been accounted for. Some were recently discovered in unmarked graves in
central Beijing, and Ding Zilin, whose 17-year old son, Jiang Jielian,
was shot in the back near Tiananmen Square, believes the reconstruction
of Beijing makes it "extremely difficult to find any more remains". Dr
Jiang Yanyong, who became a national hero for speaking out about the
official lies about last year's Sars outbreak, is the only one to have
shed new light on the events. He now lives in far away Xinjiang, exiled
for writing a letter urging an apology. "Errors committed by our party
should be resolved by the party," he wrote. "The sooner this is done,
the better. The vast majority of people I know in every quarter of
society are all clear in their hearts that the 4 June crackdown was
absolutely wrong. But because of the pressure from above, they haven't
dared speak their mind." In the letter, Dr Jiang
told how the bodies arrived at the People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Hospital 301. In two hours, 89 victims with bullet wounds were treated.
He said he treated seven victims who had been hit by dum-dum bullets or
bullets which expand on impact. These are banned under international
law. He said the PLA acted in "a frenzied fashion,
using tanks, machine guns, and other weapons to suppress the totally
unarmed students and citizens, killing innocent students". He
revealed that Yang Shangkun, the senior PLA warlord who imposed martial
law through loudspeakers on Tiananmen Square, had opposed the army's
entry in Beijing and had insisted no blood should be shed. With another
senior leader, Chen Yun, he later tried persuade Mr Deng to overturn
the verdict. Before Yang Shangkun died, he told Dr
Jiang in 1998 that "The 4 June incident is the most serious mistake
committed by our party in history ... I don't have the ability to
rectify it, but it will definitely be rectified." Although
the events were seen as a struggle between innocent students and a
wicked dictatorship, the students were pawns in a power struggle
between two factions. This paralysed the security apparatus, allowing
the dissidents and student activists to do whatever they wanted. And
although the drama was played out in Beijing, millions more in cities
across the country mounted the largest political protests to grip
China. Even in the rural towns in peripheral provinces, such as Guangxi
or Guizhou, students organised protests sanctioned by local party
officials who thought they were obeying instructions from party
headquarters. The reformers were confident they had
the people on their side, but the die-hard military men won easily
after they arrested the titular party chief, Zhao Ziyang. The
hardliners seized power in a coup, even before the troops entered
Beijing, and it is still not clear who ordered the bloodshed or why. Over
the 20th century, six armies had marched into China's ancient capital,
including the Japanese, but the PLA was the only one to smash its way
in. There was fierce and unexpected resistance and I saw dozens of
burnt-out tanks and armoured personnel carriers, stopped in their
tracks by a furious resistance. Some stories blame
Deng Xiaoping for insisting that blood must be shed, but Yang Shangkun
and his brother, General Yang Baibing, were in control. Mr Deng was
shunted aside and took until late 1991 to force the Yangs out. In
1989, the country hovered on the brink of civil war as each player
moved loyal military units to the centre for a showdown. Just how close
China was to the edge of disaster we may not know for decades, but the
CIA and many others seemed confident when they kept predicting that
political chaos was just round the corner. Deng
Xiaoping's ability to relaunch the economic reforms in 1992 probably
saved China's Communist Party although at the cost of embracing
capitalism. Among other things, this meant student leaders who fled the
country were denied the support of wealthy overseas Chinese in Hong
Kong who might have financed an opposition party. Mr
Deng started a stampede of investors by gestures such as opening stock
markets. Overseas Chinese tycoons quickly changed sides and the
students, including Wang Dan, Chai Ling and Wu'er Kaixi, found
themselves out in the cold in America, on a useless conference circuit,
or trading their ideals for Wall Street jobs. Deng
Xiaoping's formula has been used repeatedly. Every time the party has
run into trouble, as it did last year or in 1998, it has pumped huge
amounts into infrastructure projects - airports, roads, motorways,
railways, ports, telecommunications systems, sewage works, offices,
housing - that lifted growth to double digits. Although
much has been wasted with over-investment in most industrial sectors,
it worked wonders at home and abroad. The lure of the market won over
the moral scruples of Western governments who wanted to treat China
like a giant rogue state after 1989. The divisions in the party were
buried as many of the 60 million members became fabulously wealthy
through trading monopolies or selling off state assets, especially
land. But prosperity is underpinned by an
apartheid-like pass system which keeps 900 million peasants tied to the
farm, forbidden even to own the land they work. For others,
unemployment runs at 20 percent in many rust-belt industrial cities.
Rural incomes have stagnated for most of the past 15 years, and wages
for the unskilled have barely risen. In fact,
whatever the official figures may say, the economy has veered wildly
with periods of flat growth in years such as 1990, 1991, 1995 and 1998.
Yet everyone does live better now. China is being touted as a model to
be copied by India and others. Yet some the lessons to be drawn in the
15 years since Tiananmen Square are less than appealing. China
shows, or seems to, that democracy is not the key to prosperity. It is
no closer to democracy or respecting basic freedoms of association such
as the right to strike or even to form trade unions. Mutual
fear remains the pillar of political stability. The party is so nervous
of its support that Jiang Zemin has ordered that the smallest sign of
opposition must be "nipped in the bud". The past 10
years have seen a draconian "strike-hard campaign", in which even the
rudimentary safeguards of the Chinese legal system have been ditched by
a powerful police apparatus which has tripled in size. It remains in
power at the point of a gun. I wept for the people, betrayed by their leaders Exactly 15 years ago, Michael Fathers was filing for The Independent on the protests in Tiananmen Square. This is an abridged version of his report on 4 June 1989 It
will go down in the annals of China's Communist party as The Glorious
4th of June, when the army founded for the people turned on the unarmed
citizens of Beijing to destroy a peaceful student-led democracy
movement. The killing around Tiananmen Square
started soon after midnight. I was at the southern end of the square
when two armoured personnel carriers roared down the boulevard,
smashing barriers. They were followed by 3,000 soldiers. One vehicle
stalled and was set on fire by the mob. Flares and tracer bullets shone
from behind me and gunfire could be heard. The troops were advancing on
the square. My colleague, Andrew Higgins, was behind, at Qianmen Gate,
the front entrance to the square. He said troops were met with a hail
of bricks and stones. Everyone fled, then regrouped. To
the north, more gunfire could be heard. I moved up a side street,
heading for the Avenue of Eternal Peace, where tanks had broken through
a barrier of burning buses. It was 1.30am and the start of a huge troop
advance. I hid at the entrance to a lane. The armour was followed by
troop trucks interspersed with petrol tankers and lorries with mesh
trailers for prisoners. I decided to leave the lane
and follow this other army to Tiananmen, half a mile away. The Avenue
of Eternal Peace was deserted. Gunfire mingled with explosions from
buses behind me, a lorry and two Jeeps ahead. I looked behind as I
walked on the opposite side: a squad of army goons, waving pistols,
cattle prods and batons, was running towards me. They jumped me,
screamed, pointed a pistol at my head, beat me about the legs and
dragged me to New China Gate. They pulled off my spectacles and crushed
them, then took me behind a stone lion guarding the gate. If
this is the People's Army, God spare China. They behaved like the Red
Guards, with a systematic and frenzied brutality. They were the very
institution once called out to protect China from Red Guard excesses.
Now they are killing civilians. The smooth face of
the Communist establishment appeared two hours later, in cream flannels
and a pastel T-shirt, the image of "moderation" the Foreign Office has
come to believe is the new China and which it can trust over Hong Kong.
"You have committed an unfriendly act," he said. I thought that was a
bit much. "You fell over, didn't you? That's why you have that bruise
on your arm." I also had boot marks and bloodstains on my shirt. My
right knee was swollen, my hips ached, my trousers were ripped. He
confiscated my notebook and gave me a receipt and a written pass to get
beyond the army lines into a side street. Higgins
was by now crawling in the mud beside Mao's portrait at the Gate of
Heavenly Peace, as bullets whizzed over his head. At first, he said,
there was some panic among the soldiers when they saw the crowd. But
they were ordered to fire. An armoured personnel carrier was set alight
when it stopped. The crew were beaten but students intervened and
rescued them. The army had nabbed me at 2am. By
4am, when they let me go, gunfire could still be heard. At one stage
students came from side streets, shouting "Go home, go home" to stalled
lorries outside the leadership compound. They were scattered by
militiamen with clubs, probably the one occasion during the night when
they did not use guns. I blubbed when I got back to
my hotel. I couldn't stop. Perhaps it was shock, or maybe it was
because of the carnage. I was weeping for the people of Beijing. I
cannot see how they are ever likely to trust their leaders again. RETURN TO MENU |
How the war on terror has left the Dalai Lama in the lurch
China's rise as a global power has made Tibet's fight for independence less appealing to the Western world, reports Jasper Becker 27 May 2004 Radiating
smiles and beatitude, the 14th Dalai Lama is back in Britain on his
endless peregrination around the world's capitals and will probably
hear the usual pious but insincere expressions of support. As
China looms ever larger in the world, European leaders are increasingly
shunning the Buddhist monk and the cause of Tibetan independence grows
dimmer. In France where the Dalai Lama passed through, President
Jacques Chirac has not met him since 1998. In
Germany, Chancellor Gerhard Shroeder has never dared meet him in the
five years since he took office although his junior coalition partners,
the Green Party were once vociferous in demanding full independence for
Tibet. In Britain, Tony Blair - who met him in 1999
- has not found time in his schedule for another meeting, provoking
questions in Parliament. The Prime Minister responded by denying he was
avoiding him. "I've actually met the Dalai Lama on previous occasions.
I'll be very happy to meet him again on subsequent occasions," he said.
"As for the issue of Tibet, which is a matter of
concern to MPs on all sides of the House, this is an issue we raise
constantly with the Chinese - most recently on the visit of Premier
Wen, when we had a significant and long discussion on Tibet," he
continued. Alison Reynolds of the Free Tibet
campaign group attacked the decision. "Given the world's pre-occupation
with the 'War on Terror' it seems extraordinary that the Prime Minister
would pass up the chance to meet the most prominent man of peace," she
said. "Britain, more than any other western country, has a longstanding
relationship with Tibet and should therefore be at the forefront of
efforts to promote an end to China's present day occupation of Tibet." The
Dalai Lama will however meet Foreign Secretary Jack Straw and Prince
Charles and has been invited to visit the Scottish Parliament. Another
factor is China's economic boom, and the desperation of Western leaders
to stay on side with Beijing, so that businesses continue to enjoy the
good times. A Nobel Peace prize winner and the
world's most famous advocate of non-violence, the Dalai Lama ought to
have found his standing rising in a world obsessed with the War on
Terror but though he remains universally admired, he is on the contrary
increasingly ignored. The Tibetan issue has
gradually faded from prominence and the Dalai Lama's demands have
shrunk in the past 20 years from full independence to not much more
than a plea for tolerance and autonomy. China is
trying hard to make him an international non- person, the way it has
succeeded in doing with the leadership of Taiwan. Even the United
States does not dare officially to allow President Chen Shui-bian
permission to enter the country for fear of offending Beijing except on
a transit visa. With Beijing's blessing European
Union representatives such as Chris Patten or Swedish Prime Minister
Goran Persson, are happy to meet a tyrant like North Korean leader Kim
Jong Il responsible for the deaths of millions. Yet they have all
ostracised President Chen, a democratically elected leader of a
prosperous and peaceful state. Until now, the Dalai
Lama has been saved from a similar fate by his unique status as both a
spiritual guru and as the political leader of the Tibetan
government-in-exile. Yet on present trends, the Dalai Lama will no
longer be received at the highest levels for much longer. All
of China's neighbours have given in to Chinese pressure and refused to
allow him in on anything resembling an official visit. Even countries
with a strong Buddhist tradition - South Korea, Japan, Thailand,
Mongolia and Burma have all rejected visits or declined to accord him
the protocol his rank had hitherto commanded.. Russia
is insisting that there can be no official meetings even though it is
now considering letting him in to perform religious pastoral duties for
his followers. India, home to the Tibetan exile
government, is being forced to reconsider its position as Beijing and
New Delhi are drawn together by economic interests. Last
year Nepal, the chief conduit for the thousands of refugees who flee
the country every year, suddenly reversed its tolerant policy and began
handing over the escapees to the custody of the Chinese embassy in
Kathmandu. Only after intensive pressure did it stop this and resume
allowing the refugees to be handled by UN High Commission for Refugees.
Outside a few small countries in Europe, the Dalai Lama's remaining
hold out is in North America. President Bush has not hesitated to
invite him to the White House on two occasions and Congress continues
to pass motions supportive of Tibetan rights. This
month the Dalai Lama spent 19 days touring Canada attracting huge
crowds and the support of pop stars like Alanis Morissette. In Ottawa,
Paul Martin became the first Canadian premier to meet the Dalai Lama,
defying protests by China and the fears of the powerful Canadian
business community. Even so it was only a brief meeting which the
Canadians stressed was only about religion Beijing
routinely threatens to punish those that deny its edicts. Chinese
officials threatened to strip Liverpool of its status as a twin city to
Shanghai unless it withdrew its invitation to the Dalai Lama. In China,
the Dalai Lama continues to vilified in a stream of propaganda and
those who show their support for him by openly displaying his
photograph risk long prison terms. "The destiny and
future of Tibet can no longer be decided by the Dalai Lama and his
clique. Rather, it can only be decided by the whole Chinese nation,
including the Tibetan people," said a White Paper issued last week by
Beijing. "This is an objective political fact in
Tibet that cannot be denied or shaken." The 30-page white paper,
released by the Information Office of the State Council robustly
rejected the Dalai Lama's offer to accept a limited autonomy. "It
is hoped that the Dalai Lama will look reality in the face, make a
correct judgment of the situation, truly relinquish his stand for
'Tibet independence', and do something beneficial to the progress of
China and the region of Tibet in his remaining years," said the
document entitled Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet . Even
though the Dalai Lama has officially declared he is no longer seeking
independence and would keep Tibet inside China, all this suggests he is
never going to allowed back to Tibet and may never be welcomed in
Beijing. Since 1995, he has pressed to make a pilgrimage to the holy
mountain of Wutaishan in north-west China as a way of getting talks
started. Such a visit seemed highly possible during US President Bill
Clinton's visit to China in 1998. At 68, and in
exile for 45 years, the Dalai Lama cannot have many years left to
carrying on his peregrinations and some analysts suspect the Chinese
are only waiting for him to die in order to replace him with a
candidate of their own. After the 10th Panchen Lama
died almost 14 years ago, the Chinese rejected the Dalai Lama's choice
of his successor and seized the boy and his family. Instead Beijing
appointed their own candidate who will one day probably be called upon
to lead the Tibetans during the period until a new Dalai Lama is
recognised and reaches adulthood. The pace of
Chinese immigration has stepped up and will be further boosted when the
first railway line linking Tibet to the rest of China opens in a few
years. Certainly, the hopes which flared among
Tibetans during the 1980s when Beijing opened indirect negotiations
with the Dalai Lama and faced down an uprising which started in Lhasa
have now faded. The unrest was stamped out after 1989 when Lhasa was
put under martial law by the current President of China, Hu Jintao. At
least 800 Tibetans were arrested, many of them monks and nuns, and
given long prison sentences. Even 15 years on - by official accounts -
more than 145 Tibetans serving terms for political crimes. "China
is not yet ready to seriously discuss more freedoms for Tibet," the
Dalai Lama observed during his tour of Canada but he said he was
confident that "democracy, rule of law, freedom of religion, freedom of
speech, open information - these things will come." The
Dalai Lama's best hope now rests with Washington. He emerged from the
White House last autumn saying that Bush and Secretary of State Colin
Powell had shown "interest and genuine sympathy" for Tibet. A
White House spokesman said: "The president reiterated the strong
commitment of the US to the preservation of Tibet's unique religious,
cultural and linguistic identity and the protection of the human rights
of all Tibetans." Optimists believe that as
relations between Washington and Beijing have warmed after China
entered the World Trade Organisation and the US was no longer
threatening trade sanctions on human rights issues, China has been more
willing to start a dialogue with the Tibetans. Yet despite strong
support from the US, the dialogue has made little or no progress. Instead
the Chinese government is intent on tightening its grip over the
Tibetans by launching new campaigns targeting the Dalai Lama's
followers across the country. In October 2003, another monk, Nyima
Dragpa died, reportedly as a result of repeated torture while serving a
nine-year sentence for advocating Tibetan independence. 54 YEARS IN TIBET 1950: Chinese Army invades. 1951: Tibet becomes a "national autonomous region" under Dalai Lama's rule. Actual control held by Chinese Communist Party. 1959:
Tibetans launch an armed separatist revolt, which is suppressed. Dalai
Lama flees to India with 80,000 followers, establishes a
"government-in-exile". 1965: Tibetan Autonomous Region formally established. 1966:
Cultural Revolution begins in China. Red Guards take Tibetan capital of
Lhasa. Religious practices banned, at least 4,000 monasteries
destroyed. 1976: Religious ban lifted. 1989: China imposes martial law. Tibet's "government-in-exile" disbands. 1991: China agrees to hold talks with exiled leaders. 1999: Beijing rules Tibet an "inseparable part of China" and Dalai Lama must drop demands for independence. May 2004: Dalai Lama in UK Tony Blair refuses to meet. RETURN TO MENU |
Why all the world feels China's growing pains
The side-effects of the Chinese economic miracle have an increasingly global reach. Jasper Becker reports on an economic phenomenon that affects everything from Egyptian sea cucumbers to British bicycle shops 08 May 2004 Off
the remote north-east coast of Borneo, a Malaysian patrol vessel hailed
a suspicious looking trawler last week. When marine police boarded,
they found a catch of 160 dead giant leatherback turtles, the most
endangered of all sea turtles. The poachers, who had poisoned the
waters with cyanide, came from China's southern province of Hainan,
more than 1,000 miles away. That same day, stock
markets across Asia and Europe shuddered when the Chinese Premier Wen
Jiabao - who arrives in Britain for a three-day visit tomorrow - warned
that he was taking "very forceful measures" to slow China's runaway
economy. "The coming slowdown in the Chinese
economy should be viewed as a global event," warned chief Morgan
Stanley economist Stephen Roach. "There is good reason to believe that
the impacts of a sharp slowdown in the Chinese investment cycle could
spread well beyond Asia." For better or worse,
every ripple from this giant economy, which is driven by the
fast-expanding needs of 1.3 billion consumers, can now be felt across
the world. Without China, even the mighty US could not run its huge
trade and budget deficits. China is the world's second largest buyer of
US government debt, as it recycles a $124bn trade surplus with the
United States. No less significantly, the country's frenetic
construction boom is driving up world prices of nearly every commodity,
while large-scale foreign investment is powering a flood of exports
which is bringing down global prices for manufactured goods. Officially,
China represents less than 4 per cent of the world's economy. But its
spectacular rate of industrial production - which grew by 16.3 per cent
last year alone - is making its effects felt all over the world. Last
year, China accounted for 7 per cent of global oil consumption, 27 per
cent of steel, 31 per cent of coal and 40 per cent of cement. And its
appetite for raw materials has been growing for years. Optimists
are busy making plans on how to make money by satisfying China's
growing demand for timber, iron ore, copper, grain, water, power, fish,
meat, cars and everything else. Others fear the
environmental consequences of unconstrained growth. Last year, China
added 1.8 million cars to its roads, bringing the total to over 10
million. At recent growth rates, the number of cars could double every
three to four years. The world's top carmakers are
rushing to build new factories in China. Volkswagen announced last
weekend plans for a new plant in China to help it ramp up output to 1.6
million vehicles there by 2008. DaimlerChrysler has just signed a €1bn
contract to build a Mercedes-Benz car factory in Beijing in the hope
that current annual demand for 12,000 of the top models will soon
double. Yet were car ownership rates ever to match
those in the United States (135 million for a population of 270 million
in 2002), then there would be about 600m vehicles on China's roads,
more than all the cars in the world today. China's
own environmental record is so lamentable that if it were ever to
import Western consumer habits, we might all suffer the consequences.
Imagine, for example, what would happen if coal production were to
double. China relies on coal for 75 per cent of its energy and already
spews out 19 million tons of sulphur dioxide a year, compared with 11
million tons for the United States. It would soon rival the US as the
world's largest source of greenhouse gases - although as a "developing
nation" China is exempted by the Kyoto treaty from cutting its carbon
dioxide emissions. The implications for global warming hardly bear
thinking about. Environmentalists point out that
China's "ecological footprint", though large and increasing, is
considerably less per head than that of either the US or the UK. Even
now, however, the inhabitants of roughly two-thirds of the 340 Chinese
cities, where air quality is monitored, breathe air that fails to meet
national air-quality levels (which are considerably less stringent than
World Health Organisation norms). Indoor pollution from coal burning
takes more than 700,000 lives a year. Then there is
water. Two thirds of China's major cities are now seriously short of
fresh water, and as many as 700 million people drink water that is
contaminated with human and animal waste and that doesn't come close to
meeting government standards (also below world norms). Most
lakes and rivers are now heavily polluted; coastal waters are plagued
by red tides of algae. Fishing stocks are so exhausted that Beijing has
had to impose ever longer fishing moratoriums and to try to cut the
size of its fishing fleet. But it isn't just China
that suffers. The North China plain, home to 200 million peasants who
used to grow half of China's wheat, is drying up. The spring dust
storms which swirl out of North China and Mongolia are now depositing
dust as far away as the US. As the water table
falls, large areas of farmland will be taken out of production and
China will soon need food imports so large they will dwarf existing
world reserves. Wheat production has been falling in China since 2000,
and its once massive stockpiles of wheat and corn have disappeared.
World food prices are bound to rise as a result, causing hardship for
the 800 million people around the world who are already short of food. China
has so far succeeded only in exporting its environmental problems. When
a national logging ban was introduced following disastrous Yangtze
floods in 1998, timber imports from Burma, Thailand, Laos and Indonesia
shot up. Imports from Burma reached 1 million cubic metres in 2002 and,
according to the environmental organisation Global Witness, may have
reached 1.4 million cubic metres in 2003. As a result, hundreds of
square miles of ancient tropical forests in Burma have disappeared. South-east
Asia is also reeling under the impact of China's plans to build dozens
of new giant dams across the Mekong, the Salween, the Irrawaddy, and
the Brahmaputra. The Mekong River Commission, an international body
representing Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam, made official
protests this year because the 4,500km-long river has seen record low
flows since January and strange and unprecedented fluctuations in
levels. China's construction of two large hydroelectric dams - the
Manwan and Dachaoshan - is blamed. Two more dams are under
construction, while at least another four are being planned. After
protests in Thailand and Burma against plans to build 13 hydro-power
dams on the Salween River, China ordered one of the dams to be
cancelled. Sooner or later, however, all China's rivers will be
completely dammed. To keep its economy expanding, China needs some 800
million to 900 million kilowatts of electricity a year. Yet it
currently generates just 350 million kilowatts. In
the past four years, China has gone from a surplus of energy to a
deficit so serious that even cities like Shanghai have had to start
rationing electricity. From being nearly self-sufficient in oil ten
years ago, China is now the world's second biggest oil importer - and
is on the verge of needing massive coal imports as well. China
is likely to realise plans to triple installed hydroelectric capacity
to 270,000 megawatts by 2020: 28 large-scale hydropower projects are
now being built, adding to 835 existing large hydropower plants. Many
are in the central Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi and Anhui provinces where
power outages were frequent last year. Yet China's
growing needs are also creating a boom for its neighbours. Many are now
busy investing in giant gas fields or long oil pipelines to satisfy
demand. Kazakhstan has said it will start building a 3,000km oil
pipeline to China from the Caspian Sea later this year. Moscow
will soon declare a decision on a pipeline to carry up to 20 million
tons of oil each year from Siberia to China. And most of Angola's oil
exports now go to China. Chinese oil companies are
planning big investments in the Persian Gulf, while this year China
National Offshore Oil Corp bought Indonesian offshore reserves from
Spain's Repsol YPF for $585m. To provide more natural gas, China has
turned to Australia. In 2002, an Australian-led consortium and an
Indonesian gas field operated by Britain's BP won contracts to supply
China with liquefied natural gas (LNG). This year ALNG, a consortium
led by Australian energy giant Woodside, won a 25-year deal worth up to
$13.5bn to supply an LNG terminal in China's Guangdong province while
Indonesia will supply LNG for a proposed second terminal. China's
construction frenzy has fuelled a sustained rally in world commodity
prices. It all started after the Asian financial crisis in 1998 when
Beijing feared a wave of social unrest. The fires were fanned again
last year during the Sars epidemic, when the economy looked like it was
heading for a contraction until the government stoked lending to
encourage a new wave of mass construction. Although
Chinese leaders are now busy trying to organise a "soft landing" for an
economy which saw a 43 per cent jump in fixed-asset investment in the
first quarter of the year, they may find it hard to put the genie back
in the bottle. China has doubled its steel output
since 2000, with half being used in construction. It is now the world's
largest producer by a wide margin, but capacity will double again in
the next three years. The pace of spending on new steel mills tripled
from 2002 to 2003, making a world-wide glut more or less inevitable. Many
countries, including Australia and Brazil, are gambling on the belief
that the music will not stop. Rio Tinto has just said that it will rush
ahead to open a new mine in central Queensland, Australia, to export
5.5 million tons of coking coal a year to China. BHP Billiton is
expanding cooper output at its mines in Chile, and spending $1.4bn on
developing a new nickel deposit in western Australia. Other
companies are preparing to invest more than $5bn to upgrade Brazilian
ports and railways, in order to handle a surge in deliveries of iron
ore and soya beans to China. China has suddenly become Brazil's
third-biggest single export market after a 51 per cent jump in trade
last year. Meanwhile, South Korea's exports to
China expanded 48 per cent last year, accounting for 80 per cent of the
country's $15bn trade surplus, and most of its recent economic growth.
Much of the trade is in parts for processing into manufactured consumer
goods that are destined for the US. The growth of
China's foreign trade has also breathed new life into the world's
ailing shipping industry, with tanker rates tripling over the last two
years. Thanks to Beijing, the shipping industry is now running at full
capacity. But the boom will surely have to end
sooner or later. When it does, the world is likely to be left with vast
overcapacity in steel and cars - just as the previous boom left China
producing too many TV sets and motorbikes, now being dumped on world
markets. By then, however, enough fortunes will
have been made in China to create a new surge in demand for high-priced
luxuries, from Armani suits to sea turtles. In Borneo or Milan, the
China effect is likely to carry on being felt for some time yet.
RETURN TO MENU
BEIJING DISPATCH
Far East
by Jasper Becker Post date 01.23.03 | Issue date 02.03.03 |
In
Crawford, Texas, last October and on the phone this month, Chinese
President Jiang Zemin confidently promised his new friend President
George W. Bush that he would do his utmost to help solve the North
Korea problem. Speaking after the Crawford summit, Jiang told
reporters, "China has all along been a supporter of a nuclear-free
Korean Peninsula. ... [W]e will continue to consult on this issue and
work together to ensure a peaceful resolution." In return, Bush has
thanked Jiang effusively, praising China for being "very helpful" and
singling out Jiang for his "constructive leadership." The
reality is less sanguine. China has minimal influence with Pyongyang,
which has distrusted Beijing for years. Despite this, China has been
milking the North Korea issue for some time to show the United States
it can be an upstanding member of the international community, and
China has been earning a rich reward for doing very little regarding
Pyongyang. Despite historical links, enmity between
Beijing and Pyongyang runs deep. China may have sent one million
soldiers to rescue North Korea from defeat after it invaded the South
in 1950, but relations have been poor, if not actively hostile, for
most of the last 35 years. First came angry name-calling during the
Cultural Revolution, when China's Red Guards attacked the former North
Korean dictator Kim Il Sung for living too extravagant a lifestyle. When
Deng Xiaoping came to power in China in 1978, the relationship soured
further. Fresh from winning a mandate to demolish Maoism, Deng arrived
on a state visit to Pyongyang in September 1978 and could not help
expressing revulsion at the absurdity of Kim Il Sung's personality
cult. Like all other visitors, Deng was brought to pay his respects to
the statue of "eternal president" Kim Il Sung. China's diminutive
leader looked up at the 70-foot statue and noticed it was covered from
head to toe in hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of gold. He
complained to his hosts that they had squandered massive amounts of
Chinese aid by building the monument and now had the nerve to demand
more money. Later, Deng refused to grant future aid and demanded that
the North reform its economy. The statue incident
triggered a serious rift not only with Kim Il Sung but also with the
eternal president's eldest son, Kim Jong Il, who was busy assuring his
eventual accession to his father's throne through flattery, erecting
ever more grandiose monuments to his father. Even before Deng's slight,
Kim Jong Il had few natural ties to China. While Kim Il Sung, who was
educated in Manchuria, spoke Chinese and had even joined the Chinese
Communist Party, Kim Jong Il only came to China for the first time in
1983 on a brief visit. Accordingly, when he first
began assuming power in 1980, taking over most day-to-day duties from
his father, Kim Jong Il bridled at Beijing's suggestion that he deviate
from his father's Stalinist policies. Instead, he plunged the country
into a half-baked scheme to increase grain production by building huge
seawalls to turn tidal flats into fields. Throughout the '80s, in fact,
Kim Jong Il allegedly encouraged anti-Chinese feelings among the North
Korean public and purged his party of anyone with strong links to
China. In response, the Chinese began demanding hard currency for
exports. While China basked in record harvests by
beginning to privatize agriculture, Kim Jong Il's promises to increase
grain production became a nightmare. Grain harvests fell by half, and
by the mid-'90s North Korea was not only broke but also starving. Not
surprisingly, China became more and more irritated by the North's
continuing demands when it could have used reforms to boost
agricultural yields. Chinese schools and leaders began talking less and
less about Chinese ties to the North or about the Korean War. In
response, North Korea began an absurd effort to expunge all traces of
Chinese influence from Korean history. Chinese characters were no
longer used, as they are in South Korea, to supplement the alphabet.
When I visited the North in 1986, museum exhibits about the Korean War
made no mention of Chinese involvement whatsoever. Students in the
North complained to me about being insulted by China. Relations became
even more frigid after Beijing established diplomatic links with South
Korea in 1992 without insisting that Washington simultaneously
recognize the North. In the eyes of the North, this was betrayal of the
worst kind. By the mid-'90s, China and North Korea
were still putting out propaganda saying the two were as close as "lips
and teeth," yet Beijing's influence over Pyongyang had dwindled to
almost nothing. Occasionally, China's actions made a difference. In
1994, China's decision to cut off grain exports to the North helped
force Pyongyang to swallow its pride and deal with the international
community by appealing to the United Nations for emergency food aid. Yet
the grain decision was an exception. Beijing's leaders realize that Kim
Jong Il, who understands little of how economies function, has
mismanaged his country's economy since he was effectively put in charge
of it in 1980. Were Kim Jong Il to reform, China's northeast, one of
the poorer areas of the country, would greatly profit from increased
rail and road links. Yet China's lack of influence shows in its
continuing failure to persuade the North to copy China's economic
reforms, which, if implemented, might raise food production and
possibly even bring in foreign investment. What's more, China played
only a minimal role in resolving the 1994 nuclear crisis, which was
dominated by U.S.-North Korea meetings, and in 1998 it played a
similarly small part in defusing the crisis that erupted after North
Korea shot a missile over the Japanese islands, doing little more than
using its state media to criticize U.S. intervention in Northeast Asia.
Frustrated by the lack of economic change, China has
also in recent years suspended flights to Pyongyang, cut off commercial
lines of credit, closed down border crossings, and even restricted
goods from entering the North. Chinese companies have pulled out of the
Rajin-Sonbong free-trade zone, an early '90s scheme to lure foreign
capital to an area of North Korea along the Chinese border. China even
helped scuttle Kim Jong Il's most recent project, a special economic
zone similar to Rajin-Sonbong, by arresting a Dutch-Chinese businessman
Kim Jong Il had charged with running the zone. China was more hesitant
to send food aid to the North in 2002 and, until recently, ignored the
hundreds of thousands of North Korean refugees fleeing into China, even
though Pyongyang pressured Beijing to round up the refugees and deport
them. Despite its lack of influence, Beijing has
portrayed itself to the United States as a crucial go-between to North
Korea. In response, the Western press has begun lionizing Beijing,
running headlines such as The Philadelphia Inquirer 's on
October 26, 2002, " JIANG AGREES TO HELP DISARM NORTH KOREA. " Leading
China academics, such as Kenneth Lieberthal, have announced that China
could be on the verge of becoming a friend to America. In a New York Times article last October, Lieberthal asked in the headline, " HAS CHINA BECOME AN ALLY? " But
it is unlikely China will be able to help sway Kim Jong Il. In fact,
many academics familiar with China and North Korea, such as Scott
Snyder of the Asia Foundation in Seoul, say China is as badly informed
about what goes on in the secretive North as anyone else and that the
prospects of Jiang Zemin or other Chinese leaders directly influencing
Kim Jong Il's policies seem remote. Jiang has had several meetings with
Kim Jong Il about the nuclearization of the peninsula, but all evidence
suggests that Kim Jong Il has paid no heed at all. After all, though
China has been saying for a decade that it desires a nuclear-free North
Korea and has put pressure on Pyongyang not to go forward with nuclear
development, the North has continued with a covert nuclear weapons
program. In fact, in recent years, China has drawn
closer to Seoul than to Pyongyang. Today, China and South Korea conduct
over $100 billion in two-way trade annually, and South Korea is now one
of the largest investors in China. These days, the Chinese joke is that
North Korea is the official wife, but it is the concubine, South Korea,
which is loved. Unfortunately for the Bush administration's efforts at
multilateral diplomacy, Pyongyang feels just about as warmly about
Beijing.
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BEIJING DISPATCH
Mussolini Redux
by Jasper Becker Post date 06.16.03 | Issue date 06.23.03 With
clenched fists raised high, the rows of students in red neckties stood
solemnly amid the baroque ruins of the great Qing Emperor Qianlong's
Garden of Perfect Splendor and swore an oath of loyalty to the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP). Amid this tangible symbol of how the West
humiliated China--British and French troops burned down the garden in
1860--they vowed to sacrifice their lives to the nation and affirmed
their belief that only the CCP can restore China to its former glory. The
ceremony was only one of hundreds of similar rituals performed
regularly by youth cadres these days in China, where the CCP has
abandoned even its pretenses of being a communist organization. Yet
this jettisoning of communism is hardly reason to celebrate. As the
militaristic garden rite suggests, China today is replacing communism
with something at least as bad: It is becoming a right-wing fascist
state eerily similar to 1920s Italy. In the last
two decades of the twentieth century, former Chinese leaders Deng
Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin discarded nearly every element of communism.
Current leader Hu Jintao, who met President George W. Bush last week
for the first time in Hu's current capacity, is continuing Deng's and
Jiang's work. State farms and factories have been privatized. Stock
markets have been opened in Shanghai, Shenzhen, and other cities. China
has joined the World Trade Organization and has begun to adhere to
international commercial laws. Guaranteed health insurance and pensions
have been jettisoned. People have become freer to move around the
country, purchase consumer goods, travel abroad, and generally live
private lives. At the sixteenth CCP Congress last
November, where Jiang handed over the reins to Hu, the CCP cut its last
links to its past as a revolutionary Marxist organization. For the
first time, CCP leaders formally allowed capitalists into the party.
They abandoned their long-standing claim to represent only the working
class and now champion all of society's interests and embrace
free-market economic policies. At the conference, keynote speakers
dropped all references to Marx, Engels, Lenin, or Stalin. In fact,
party leaders now often boast that China's cheap and docile labor force
is its greatest attraction to foreign businesses. Realizing
that the demise of communism deprived the CCP of an ideology and a
reason to exist, Jiang, Hu, and their peers are quietly remaking China
into a fascist state bearing a striking resemblance to its '20s
predecessors. This is not the fascism of the Nazis, with its
racial-extermination campaigns and ambitions to reshape the world
through total war, but the kind of highly nationalistic right-wing
dictatorship that emerged in the '20s and '30s in Germany, Spain,
Japan, Romania, and, most notably, Italy. Since at least the late '80s,
CCP leaders have demonstrated a commitment to protecting private
property while supporting interventionist, futurist industrial
policies, an economic program recalling fascist ideas of "planned
capitalism." One of the oft-repeated phrases about Benito Mussolini is
that he "made the trains run on time." In other words, in Mussolini's
Italy, the state took responsibility for an extensive program of public
works that glorified the nation, boosting economic growth and
encouraging industrialization. Il Duce doubled iron and steel
production; drained the Pontine Marshes, a massive area of
mosquito-infested bog land; and built the autostrada, a national
highway system--all with state deficit spending. Similarly,
the Chinese government has embarked upon an unprecedented series of
massive public projects that glorify China and the CCP. These projects
range from the Three Gorges Dam, the world's largest, to cross-country
oil pipelines. And, just as the public works-heavy economic policies of
fascist Italy, Germany, and Japan initially produced strong
growth--Germany's economy expanded by 73 percent between 1933 and
1937--so too has China posted high growth rates in recent years.
Mussolini himself oversaw an extensive program of public works that
stimulated employment for a time. Beyond supporting
massive public works, China's still-developing fascism encompasses
other aspects of state intervention combined with limited private
entrepreneurship. In Mussolini's time, Italian fascists grouped
businesses into legally recognized syndicates, such as the National
Fascist Confederation of Commerce. Beijing is doing the same. Il Duce
himself personally rejected the Soviet Union's goals of abolishing
private property and emphasized that corporate interests were important
components of society--as long as they were kept in syndicates and
guided by the state. China allows private business ownership but
demands that its network of CCP cells, which operate within all medium-
and large-sized companies, coordinate among corporations within the
same industry and ensure that the party remains in control of
competition between companies. At the November CCP Congress, many
Western media outlets reported that Jiang announced that "market forces
[should] play an essential role in the allocation of resources" within
China's economy. But Jiang actually said that market forces should
"play an essential role ... under the state's macroeconomic control."
Indeed, in recent years, the CCP has ensured that the fixed-line and
wireless-phone industries are controlled by a few large, state-linked
companies and has consolidated the country's airline industry into
several large air groups. And, like Il Duce,
China's Mandarins have made high technology a centerpiece of their
economic ideology. Mussolini was the first leader to closely link a
right-wing nationalistic program not with conservative establishment
forces but with forward-looking technological changes. In Mussolini's
time, this focus was reflected by the fascist artists of the futurism
movement, who celebrated technology as a means of advancing future
state goals and building a glorious Italy, a nation Mussolini said must
be restored to the power and glory it possessed in the days of ancient
Rome. Mussolini portrayed Italy as a nation in decay that needed to be
reunited and reinvigorated through technology used by private companies
but ultimately controlled by the state. The CCP, which also frequently
portrays China as a great nation ready to be awakened, has focused on
acquiring the most modern technology possible. Visitors to China's
museums are taught that China needs to acquire Western science both to
defend itself and to restore its former greatness. Accordingly, when
China builds new economic projects, it insists on only the most
cutting-edge ideas: Shanghai's new light-rail employs magnetic
levitation technology that makes it the fastest rail line in the world,
technology that Shanghai demanded from the European firms building the
rail. To complement its economic policies, the CCP
has developed a neo-fascist political program of mass rallies,
nationalist indoctrination, and party control over private lives--but
not such control that China today could be called totalitarian. To
teach average Chinese that China is a waking power that has often been
abused by outsiders, the CCP organizes frequent mass events, such as
the garden ceremony and giant pageants attended by hundreds of
thousands, as well as other propaganda. And, just as the press under
Mussolini played up foreigners' invasions and humiliations of Italy,
endless articles in China's state-controlled press remind the Chinese
of the West's dominance of Chinese politics and economics before World
War II and of Japan's invasion of China in the '30s. In so doing, the
party instills a permanent resentment of foreigners, even though far
more Chinese have been killed by the CCP than by the United States,
Japan, and Great Britain. The propaganda not only
looks backward but also takes in China's current competitors,
competitors who threaten the Chinese "motherland." Like Mussolini,
Jiang and Hu see their country in the midst of a Darwinian struggle
between nations. In 1932, Mussolini announced that "fascism is the
doctrine best adapted to represent the tendencies and aspirations of a
people, like the people of Italy, who are rising again after many
centuries of abasement and foreign servitude." Similarly, Jiang has
warned the party faithful that "competition in overall national
strength is becoming increasingly fierce." Beijing leverages this
victimhood and resentment of foreign powers to increase nationalism and
strengthen its international image as it aspires to become a global
superpower. On Chinese television, performers from every kind of art
express their undying patriotism and devotion to the motherland, which
is equated with the party in these devotionals. When necessary, as the
accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and the
U.S. spy plane incident of 2001, party leaders and the media draw upon
victimhood to whip up masses of protesters against the United States or
other countries. Meanwhile, Jiang and other leaders frequently tout
China's unity and national strength in messages to foreign countries
and in overseas visits. While stressing China's
growing nationalism, CCP leaders also make clear that they are in
control. Like Mussolini, who wielded power on the basis of his brand of
exuberant nationalism, which claimed to be restoring the fortunes of
the Italian people, the CCP emphasizes to the public that only the
party can channel their devotion to country and state. Like Mussolini's
fascists, who co-opted the entire Italian political spectrum, the CCP,
as part of a policy it calls "United Front," has become more inclusive
than any previous Chinese party. Instead of excluding the entrepreneur
or the intellectual or religious leader, it brings them inside the
party's fold. Any group that remains outside the CCP, however, is
punished severely. Compared with the late '80s, when there was less
personal freedom in China but more room to discuss political reform,
today China enforces fewer restrictions on people's individual lives,
but the CCP has strengthened its restrictions on any form of free
association. Tibetans, Falun Gong members, evangelical Protestants--no
one can organize any collective interest group to challenge the state.
Mussolini said, "The fascist conception of life stresses the importance
of the state and accepts the individual only insofar as his interests
coincide with the state." Seventy years later, Jiang told his
colleagues that the state "organizes the nation but leaves a sufficient
margin of liberty to the individual. ... The deciding power in this
question cannot be the individual but the state alone." As
in '20s Italy, the CCP's policies keep the ruling elites satisfied.
They ensure that profit is private and individual but that loss is
public and social. In China, the children of the party hierarchy run
semi-privatized companies where they are allowed to keep the rewards
for themselves and leave the losses to the state. These policies also
enable the party to fund a variety of showcase projects, such as a
cross-country railway, that glorify China and the CCP--at the expense
of the education and health of heavily taxed peasants. Ultimately,
these fascist policies could ruin the economy. Squandering vast sums on
projects such as the Three Gorges Dam leads to excessive public
expenditure. Some economists estimate that a proper accounting of
China's deficit would place it between 100 and 150 percent of GDP,
which is projected to rise significantly in the coming years.
Meanwhile, retaining CCP control over the economy will prevent China
from developing the rule of law and a true free market necessary to
continue its economic growth. What's more, as the
CCP becomes more fascist, it could become increasingly tempted to use
its military strength to demonstrate national glory, as Mussolini did
by invading Ethiopia in 1935. The CCP and the army are completely
intertwined--Jiang is the head of the military--and China's rhetoric is
often so vehemently irredentist that a demonstration of military
strength, perhaps by invading Taiwan, seems all too possible. The
propaganda machine is constantly engaged in an effort to elevate the
military's prestige and glorify its victories and contributions to
national unity. Far from moving toward a separation of party and
military, Jiang insists that "the people's army is a staunch pillar of
the people's democratic dictatorship," a term for the CCP. Sometimes,
party propaganda suggests that China is only biding its time until the
moment comes when it is confident enough to use its national strength
and assert its rightful claims in the world. China
need not go down that path. The most optimistic observers see China's
neo-fascism as a halfway house to democracy and point out that Taiwan
and South Korea evolved from right-wing authoritarian military
dictatorships with dirigiste economic policies into flourishing
democracies. But, unlike those smaller states, which as the cold war
ebbed came under pressure from the West to democratize, China regards
itself as an imperium for whom, as Mussolini said, "the growth of
empire, that is to say the expansion of the nation, is an essential
manifestation of vitality." Hence the immense pride China has shown in
recovering Hong Kong and Macau and in stifling the growth of democratic
institutions in these territories, tying them closer to an
authoritarian government. While China could follow
South Korea, it is more likely that the CCP will remain firmly in power
and on its fascist path. For now, there seems little domestic or
external push for democratization. After all, Mussolini's policies were
never discredited domestically, and, if not for his disastrous wars,
the fascists might still be in power there, too.
RETURN TO MENU |
BEIJING DISPATCH
Breath Test
by Jasper Becker Post date 05.01.03 | Issue date 05.12.03 This
past week, on Beijing's roads, travelers saw images straight out of the
1950s. On streets where only a month ago the Chinese could travel
largely unhindered, police checked cars to make sure people with severe
acute respiratory syndrome ( SARS ) symptoms did not leave the city. I
myself saw men and women with red handkerchiefs tied around their arms
carrying wooden staffs. They were members of neighborhood committees
responsible, in a government- mandated campaign reminiscent of the
past, for patrolling, inspecting, snooping, and reporting on their
fellow citizens to ensure full compliance with the regime's SARS
orders. As they patrol, the police and the
red-kerchiefed men and women are doing more than simply protecting
China from sinking deeper into the SARS epidemic that has spread across
the country. They are signaling that, faced with perhaps its most
serious crisis since 1989, the Communist leadership is not, as some
foreign observers have suggested, becoming more transparent. In fact,
the Beijing regime actually is falling back upon old-style campaigns of
propaganda and control. Over the past month, as the
true extent of the SARS epidemic has become clear, some Western
publications have expressed the hope that the disease will prompt the
Chinese government to open up. After the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
fired two well-known officials, Beijing Mayor Meng Xuenong and Health
Minister Zhang Wenkang, last month for covering up SARS , The Economist
ran a cover story titled " THE SARS VIRUS: COULD IT BECOME CHINA'S
CHERNOBYL? " in which its editors predicted that the disease could lead
to increased transparency and public accountability. "A health scare
may herald much more profound changes," the magazine noted. But
those predictions are likely mistaken. Unlike the 1989 Tiananmen
uprising, which led to a split between hard-liners and moderates in the
upper echelons of the party, SARS probably will not lead to a schism.
Chinese President Hu Jintao and his peers in government cut their
political teeth during the 1989 protests. Accordingly, they have
developed a fear of any opening that might decrease Beijing's power: In
the past four years, even as China has opened some segments of its
economy, they have cracked down hard on groups such as Falun Gong that
the regime perceives as threatening the party's primacy. The reformers,
who in the late '80s had advocated the removal of direct party control
of institutions such as newspapers, hospitals, and universities, no
longer hold positions of power. The party also has
maintained tight control of the media during the SARS crisis, using the
press as an old-style propaganda organ. Though Meng and Zhang were
fired, the regime has effectively prevented the media from reporting
the true spread of SARS . In contrast to the temporary glasnost of
1989, the media have little latitude to express independence from the
party. When one doctor in Beijing, Jiang Yanyong, tried to reveal this
spring how quickly SARS was spreading, state television refused to put
his story on the air. In fact, the Chinese press
has in the wake of SARS been recycling stock phrases that hail the
heroism of top leaders and the selfless devotion of the
medical-research laboratories of the army, a bastion of support for the
party. To take one example, People's Daily covered an April
visit by Hu Jintao to Guangdong, the province where SARS allegedly
originated, by saying, "Hu, as the highest state leader who personally
went to Guangdong, ... has set an example ... of cordiality and
affection for the people" and of the leadership ability he shows in
handling the crisis. The press also has been
highlighting the strength of China's scientific resources, which it
touts as crucial to handling SARS . The CCP has long emphasized its
leaders' commands of science and technology; in the '50s, for example,
the party constantly highlighted the "scientific" nature of its poorly
devised agricultural policies. Unlike in most countries, where lawyers
or diplomats rise to power, in China top officials are now mostly
trained as engineers. Beijing is emphasizing its
supposed command of science to convince the public that the party is
well-equipped to handle SARS . In the past, the party led large-scale
"patriotic" public-sanitation campaigns that virtually wiped out
syphilis, leprosy, and other diseases in the '50s and '60s, as well as
successful inoculation drives against smallpox, typhoid, diphtheria,
and other killers. The message is clear: Only party control can wipe
out SARS . The government has been supporting its
propaganda with "patriotic" mass-mobilization campaigns similar to
those in the '50s, as well as with control of professional
organizations. The regime is portraying its efforts to combat the
disease as a quasi-military campaign in which citizens are required to
"sacrifice" themselves to the national interest: Nurses become heroic
"fighters" on the front line, and the goal is "victory" over SARS .
Meanwhile, it has utilized its domination of professional organizations
to prevent professionals, such as doctors, from turning against the
party--by revealing more details about SARS cases to the foreign media
or other outsiders, for example. Every hospital, company, and other
large institution contains party officials--officials who, since SARS
broke, can quash anti-government rumblings. The
party's efforts to keep control seem to be working. In sharp contrast
to the closure of state enterprises, which have resulted in massive
protests in many areas of China in recent years, the fear of
contracting SARS has prompted the public to simply stay indoors. In
fact, people have cooperated with the government's anti- SARS measures
despite the increased restrictions on civil liberties. Ultimately,
SARS is unlikely to prompt more than a miniscule opening from the
Chinese government. Some Chinese officials have suggested in recent
days that SARS will force them to become more cooperative with the
World Health Organization (WHO) and other international bodies in the
future. Yet the officials stop short of suggesting that the WHO would
be allowed to set up health-monitoring groups in China separate from
party-controlled professional organizations. Speaking
before a group of Asian officials about SARS this week, Chinese Premier
Wen Jiabao assured the audience that the party had learned its lesson
from the disease. And it has. It's just not the lesson outsiders would
like it to learn.
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Wrenching environmental problems are plaguing the world's newest industrial powerhouse.
Can China clean up its act?
As
a foreign journalist working in China for more than a decade, I've been
impressed by its material gains—and shocked by the associated
environmental ills, which can be seen or smelled or tasted everywhere
you go. You can read no end of reports and statistics about the
problems, but experiencing their effects is quite different. A World
Bank report spelling out that China has some of the worst soil erosion
in the world takes on a whole new meaning when you're sitting at your
desk—as I was in Beijing one recent spring day—and you glance out the
window to see a vast and choking cloud of yellow dust rolling down the
Avenue of Eternal Peace like a banshee let loose from the Mongolian
steppes.
The
erosion crisis, traceable back five decades to the agricultural
policies of Chairman Mao Zedong, has been exacerbated by years of
drought, turning the steppes and plateaus of northwestern China into a
dust bowl. The dust storms that blow up each spring can sweep east
across the Korean peninsula and Japan, eventually reaching across North
America.
China may be getting richer as it turns into the workshop of the world,
but as Beijingers rich and poor admit, what good is money if you can't
breathe the air? If the economy keeps roaring along, within three
decades China could overtake the U.S. as the world's largest source of
greenhouse gases, associated with global warming. China continues to
rely on coal for 75 percent of its energy, spewing out some 19 million
tons (17 million metric tons) of sulfur dioxide a year (the U.S.
produces 11 million tons [10 million metric tons] a year) and
contributing mightily to acid rain. People in barely a third of 340
monitored Chinese cities breathe air that meets national air-quality
levels, which are below World Health Organization (WHO) norms. Indoor
air pollution from coal burning takes more than 700,000 lives a year,
and respiratory diseases cause nearly a quarter of all deaths in the
countryside.
Bad as the air can be, lack of clean fresh water presents an even
graver threat. Two-thirds of major cities are now seriously short of
it, and as many as 700 million people drink water contaminated with
human and animal waste at levels that don't come close to the
government's minimum standards (also below those of WHO). Most of the
20 billion tons (18 billion metric tons) of raw sewage produced in the
cities each year—only 10 percent of which is treated—is dumped straight
into rivers and lakes. Peasants who formerly used only human waste
(night soil) on their fields now also apply nitrogen and phosphorus
fertilizers, with the result that nutrient-laden runoff brews thick
algae in rivers, lakes, and canals. Chinese scientists find a link
between water pollution and the country's high rates of liver, stomach,
and esophageal cancers.
All this made me wonder whether the Chinese have not so much been
creating an economic superpower as committing ecological suicide.
China's leaders may be wondering the same thing. "Never has the Chinese
government put the environment issue in such an
important position," declared Xie Zhenhua, director of the State
Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), in a 2002 press report.
"It is vital to the stability and the prosperity of our country and
people."
Certainly, if you look below the surface, you will find signs that a
new consciousness is beginning to seep like rainwater through the
layers of Chinese society. Not only are people coming to accept that
the country's prosperity is bound up with caring for the environment,
but they're now also aware that efforts at environmental protection are
in turn bound up with improving systems of law and government. Good
laws mean nothing when, as is often still the case, leaders don't have
the will or means to enforce them, so some Chinese—those desperate
enough—are testing the limits of political constraints through acts of
civil disobedience. Others, meanwhile, are looking to the outside world
for expertise and money to help with conservation projects. And still
others are pioneering new ways of thinking about how to live more
harmoniously with nature. But promising as all this is, it still seems
that every environmentally friendly measure is offset by a greater
number of abuses. China's shift away from old habits and attitudes has
only just begun.
End of Excerpt
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